Major infrastructure projects and the foreign policy of the Baltic states in 2010-2014 by Mezhevich, Nikolai M.
www.ssoar.info
Major infrastructure projects and the foreign policy
of the Baltic states in 2010-2014
Mezhevich, Nikolai M.
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Mezhevich, N. M. (2014). Major infrastructure projects and the foreign policy of the Baltic states in 2010-2014. Baltic
Region, 1, 4-20. https://doi.org/10.5922/2079-8555-2014-1-1
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Free Digital Peer Publishing Licence
zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den DiPP-Lizenzen
finden Sie hier:
http://www.dipp.nrw.de/lizenzen/dppl/service/dppl/
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a Free Digital Peer
Publishing Licence. For more Information see:
http://www.dipp.nrw.de/lizenzen/dppl/service/dppl/
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-51265-9
International relations: Russia and the Baltics 
 4
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:  
RUSSIA AND THE BALTICS 
 
 
 
At the current stage of social develop-
ment, particular attention is drawn to stud-
ies that assess major infrastructure — and 
thus political — projects aimed at a quali-
tative breakthrough in the socio-economic 
development of the countries under investi-
gation. The scheduled multi-billion invest-
ments into energy sector are of political 
rather than economic nature. The projects 
to develop alternative power grids and 
high-speed railways can result in large-
scale economic downturns diminishing the 
prospects of balanced social development. 
The author addresses the classical con-
cepts of the theory of regional economy 
and new economic geography and their in-
terpretation of the interconnection between 
political and economic factors. The article 
aims to demonstrate the inconsistency be-
tween political and economic objectives of 
the development of the Baltics. The study 
contributes to a broader set of research in-
to the issues of post-Soviet economic and 
political development. The Baltic States 
follow their own political and economic 
ways. The study proves the hypothesis of 
low efficiency of large infrastructure pro-
ject and their political motivation. It is 
concluded that the disregard of the factor 
of mutually beneficial economic coop-
eration with Russia destabilizes the devel-
opment of national economic of the Baltic 
States. The author believes that modern in-
frastructure projects in the Baltic Sea re-
gion should be integrated into both western 
and eastern dimensions. 
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When addressing the participation of political forces in promoting and 
implementing major infrastructure projects, one should emphasise that the 
political system of the Baltic states differs significantly from the Russian 
one, and this difference lies not only in their proportions. However, the the-
sis that small states — due to their size — exhibit qualitatively different 
characteristics of the ruling class is erroneous. Indeed, a large territory, pop-
ulation and volume of distributed resources characteristic of China and Rus-
sia suggest a more complicated model of the alignment of interests of politi-
cians and businesspeople. The government budget is so limited that the EU 
funds become virtually the only source of possible redistribution. Moreover, 
the control system of the EU and the Baltics is geared to strict regulation of 
direct governmental subsidies. Traditionally, the funds allocated to European 
infrastructure projects are an optimal tool for political elites to intercept re-
sources. Businesses lobby their interests as to infrastructure projects not only 
in the Baltics and in Russia — it is a worldwide practice. 
In Estonia and Latvia, the relationship between politics and business has 
been following the “Nordic” or “Scandinavian” model since the 1990s. 
The Baltic Sea region is characterised by strong political and economic 
cohesion within the ruling class. Politicians and businesspeople study at 
the same schools, participate in the same student organisations, graduate 
from the same universities, and they maintain these connections throughout 
their entire lives. Of course, the emergence of an influential political group 
whose members built their careers outside the Baltics — in the USA or 
Canada — has changed this situation. However, the above conclusions 
hold true. In the Baltics, scandals and conflicts of interests are of the same 
nature and scope as in the rest of the post-Soviet space [1]. Estonian politi-
cal scientists have coined an interesting term — seemukapitalism — which 
translates as “capitalism of bros”. A total of 18,000 signatures [2] collected 
for Charter 12 indicate that its authors were right to formulate the thesis 
that “those in power feel no need to pay attention to the public anymore. 
The general opinion is that the end justifies the means. People in power 
mock the rules of democracy. Authorities are corrupt. In the name of pow-
er, one resigns themselves to lies” [1]. 
In Lithuania, examples of large corrupt projects based on the consolida-
tion of political power and business projects include the closing of Ignalina 
NPP [2], the selling of Mažeikiai oil refinery to Americans and its reselling 
to the Polish, and the construction of a national stadium in Vilnius [3]. 
A unique example of political lobbying in Lithuania is the law on estab-
lishing a national investor — Leo Lt [4]. The Leo Lt company was founded 
in May 2008 through a merger of two state-owned companies, Lietuvos en-
ergija and Rytu skirstomieji tinklai (RST), and a private-owned company, 
Vakarų skirstomieji tinklai (VST), managed by NDX energija at the time. 
The government had 61.7 % shares of Leo Lt and 38.3 % shares of NDX en-
ergija. In 2009, the Lithuanian government and NDX energija reached a 
compromise and signed an agreement on the dissolution of Leo Lt. NDX en-
ergija was granted a restitution compensation of 68m litai [5]. The company 
did not manage to complete any significant project in the field of energy and 
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went down in history as Lithuania’s Panama Canal. The right-wing party, 
Homeland Union, and its leader Andrius Kubilius as well as the ex-president 
V. Adamkus are responsible for its initiation and failure. However, this or 
that scheme of channelling budget assets to friendly companies was used by 
all politicians in the ensuing period. There is evidence of a connection be-
tween conservative leaders and business structures involved in the concept 
and design development of the port of Šventoji. 
In Latvia, political lobbying is not as intensive as in Lithuania. Examples 
thereof include the construction of the Southern Bridge in Riga and the pur-
chase of Daimler AG buses by Riga City Hall. However, large-scale infra-
structure projects and political initiatives rarely attract public attention in this 
country [6]. According to the State Control, the port of Riga spent almost 
22.2m latu inefficiently; an almost 11.3-million-lats agreement on construct-
ing a railroad on the island of Kundziņsala was concluded without a pro-
curement procedure, and 10.7m latu was spent on channel dredging. With 
the connivance of the port manager L. Loginov, the Law on Ports was vio-
lated; the implemented 24.9-million-lats projects were not part of the Free-
port of Riga Development Programme [7]. There is no information on politi-
cal bias of the port management, nor is there any clarity as to how Latvia’s 
policy towards Russia depends on such projects. 
Today, any lobbying of infrastructure projects in the Baltics is possible 
only when they are given the status of a national project, which is always the 
case in promoting major infrastructure projects. 
Corruption in the strict legal sense is not characteristic of the largest pro-
jects. National economies suffer from the implementation of economically 
unjustified projects catering for political motives. 
 
Infrastructure projects in the electric power industry 
 
For Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, splitting from the USSR did not result 
in a shortage of electrical power. The non-energy-intensive national econo-
mies of these countries easily adapted to changing price rations and increas-
ing actual cost of electrical energy. In many fields of economy, market rela-
tions co-existed with centralised electric power industries, which ensured a 
gradual and predictable increase in tariffs for small countries, whose own 
energy carriers were insufficient. Thus, “the influence of electric power in-
dustry on the current economic situation in the Baltic states and the indus-
try’s efficiency did not serve the key factors behind the launch of reforms” [8]. 
In the 1990s, the Baltics depreciated the Soviet ‘inheritance’ without any 
long-term planning. Politically, the division of the Soviet Union into inde-
pendent republics was much simpler than the division of a common transport 
and energy infrastructure. There is a new generation of citizens (and non-
citizens) who do not remember the Soviet Union but still plugs electric ap-
pliances into a common grid. 
Therefore, the issues of Russia-EU cooperation stem from the fact that 
the Baltics are still connected to the energy system of Russia and Belarus; 
however, new connections to Northern Europe are being developed. The en-
N. Mezhevich 
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ergy systems of the Baltics and Russia are connected in the framework of the 
BRELL (Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) Loop agreement con-
cluded on February 7, 2001. As of 2013, the agreement brought together: 
 Belenergo (Belarus); 
 Federal Grid Company of Unified Energy System (Russia); 
 System Operator of Unified Energy System (Russia); 
 Elering OU (Estonia); 
 Augstpieguma tikis (Latvia); 
 Litgrig UAB (Lithuania). 
The BRELL Loop is managed by the BRELL Committee that brings to-
gether representatives of system operators. 
The key non-political problems of BRELL are as follows: 
— the generating capacity structure is not homogenous; 
— not all energy systems of the region are balanced in terms of electric 
power; 
— there is a lack of regulation capacities in some energy systems domi-
nated by heat power plants; 
— electrical grids have a meshed structure; 
— the existing power generation structure may complicate energy sys-
tem balancing in the Baltic states; 
— energy surplus of the IPS North-West is not sufficient for maintaining 
a stable energy balance after the closing of Ignalina NPP and before the 
launch of Leningrad NPP II, Astravets NPP and Baltic NPP. 
The expert community almost unanimously agrees that the region com-
prised of Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Belarus and Russia (with-
out the Kaliningrad region) lacks generating capacities; this situation cannot 
be remedied without resorting to nuclear power. Partially, this situation is a 
result of the short-sighted policy of the EU, which simultaneously closed Ig-
nalina NPP in Lithuania and hampered the development of Estonia’s tradi-
tional shale energy industry (not to be confused with shale gas energy) [9]. 
Up to 50 % of the power generated by Ignalina NPP was exported to the 
Kaliningrad region and Belarus [10]. Moreover, it is likely that all old gen-
eration units at Narva Power Plants will stop operating as not complying 
with the European emission standards. 
As of today, the IPS North-West includes energy infrastructure objects 
operating in Saint Petersburg, the Murmansk, Kaliningrad, Leningrad, Nov-
gorod, Pskov and Arkhangelsk regions, and the Republics of Karelia and 
Komi. The IPS ensures synchronous parallel operation of Russian UPS and 
the energy system of the Baltics and Belarus, as well as non-synchronous 
operation (through a converter) with the energy system of Finland and elec-
tric power export to the countries of NORDEL (East Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, and Sweden). On July 1, 2009 NORDEL was dissociated, and all 
operations were delegated to the European Network of Transmission System 
Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). 
To accommodate the increasing demand for electric power, it is planned 
to introduce new NPP generating capacities (Leningrad NPP II, Kola NPP II 
International relations: Russia and the Baltics 
 8 
and the Baltic NPP) and hydropower plants (Kola Tidal Power Plant, 
Volkhov HPP VO and Lesogorsk HPP VI). 
The Northwestern Federal District participates in implementing Russia’s 
policy on electric power export/import. It is planned to further increase the 
volume of power exports to Finland. 
Before the second unit of Kaliningrad CHPP II came into operation at 
the end of 2010, power shortage in the Kaliningrad region had been over-
come through supplying 200 MW from the UPS of Russia through the elec-
tric grids of Belarus and the Baltics as well as the use of solid fuel CHPPs in 
the Kaliningrad energy system. However, there is a need to reduce the re-
gion’s dependence on a single power source — CHPP II. The danger associ-
ated with such dependence became evident after a blackout that occurred on 
August 8, 2013. 
In view of the possible unification of Lithuania’s and Poland’s energy 
systems, it was planned to create a 400 kV double-circuit power line con-
necting the Kaliningrad and Polish energy systems. This will make possible 
power interchange and surplus transmission to other European countries. 
However, similar to other aspects of Russian-Polish relations, the level of 
trust in the field of energy is rather low. So far, no agreement on Russian en-
ergy exports to Poland has not been reached. Also, certain adjustments need 
to be made in the Baltic NPP construction plans. 
It is worth noting that today the Russian-Belarusian interconnection can-
not accommodate the necessary power transit. A certain part of the Lenin-
grad NPP-Belarus current crosses the territories of Estonia and Latvia. The 
secession of these countries from BRELL is a considerable threat to the Ka-
liningrad region and Belarus. 
As to the 2001 BRELL Agreement, it is worth stressing that it does not 
contain provisions regulating the key aspects of cooperation, namely: 
— centralised coordinated planning; 
— real-time supervision; 
— financial tools to rectify discrepancies between the actual and planned 
power transfer. 
The key problem is that the corporate nature of the BRELL Agreement 
does not solve the problems arising from the fact that the parties are in dif-
ferent jurisdictions [11]. 
Today, the Baltics set out to separate themselves from the Russian and 
Belarusian energy system. The Estonian minister of Economic Affairs and 
Communications, Juhan Parts, emphasised on many occasions that the seces-
sion of the Baltics from the BRELL system was inevitable and necessary for 
the development of the European energy market [12]. 
The Russian authorities, being convinced that a unilateral decision on the 
division of the energy system is impossible, strongly criticise the plans of the 
European Commission on the secession of the Baltics from the unified en-
ergy system that brings together North-West Russia and Belarus. Upon an 
agreement of all parties, on April 8, 2002, the energy systems of Latvia, Es-
tonia and Lithuania, as well as the Kaliningrad region and a part of Belarus, 
were disconnected from the energy system of North-West Russia for a per-
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formance test. The disconnection was managed by the coordination centre 
DC Baltija located in Riga. The test showed that the Baltic energy system 
was capable of independent functioning; the obtained data will be used to 
regulate the frequency of the energy system of the Baltics and the UPS, 
which function in parallel operation, and later to ensure the synchronous op-
eration with other European energy systems [13]. 
However, the positions of the parties changed significantly due to mu-
tual distrust. In August 2012, the Lithuanian minister of energy, Arvydas 
Sekmokas, disclosed that Russia was preparing for the disconnection of the 
Baltics from the IPS/UPS energy system (it brings together the energy sys-
tems of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania as well as the CIS countries with the 
exception of Armenia and Turkmenistan). According to the minister, on 
August 1, 2012, the Kaliningrad region tested the preparedness of the re-
gional power system to operate after the disconnection from the other sys-
tems. “Such tests suggest that, realising the strategic objective of the Bal-
tics to ensure synchronous operation with the continental European grid, 
Russia is getting ready to desynchronise the power systems of the Baltics 
from the Russia IPS/UPS system” [14]. This raises a question on the nature 
of Vilnius’s concerns. Is Lithuania alarmed by the fact that Kaliningrad 
power engineers do not rule out a possibility that the Baltics could “leave” 
the unified power system? The aspiration of the Baltics to secede from the 
BRELL without consultations and coordination with Russia and Belarus is 
fraught with potential problems for the latter. Up to 40 % of transfer capac-
ity between the energy systems of Russia’s Centre and North-West de-
pends on the grids of the Baltic states. The BRELL project was aimed at 
facilitating the development of electrical power transmission and gas sup-
ply infrastructure from the Russian Federation to the European Union as 
well as ensuring joint operation of the power systems of the Russian Fed-
eration and the European Union [15]. 
“The creation of an open competitive market in the Baltics is justified 
only if it brings together all three Baltic states. Developing an energy 
market in each country is not reasonable due to its limited scope” [11]. In 
theory, Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius are aware of this circumstance. How-
ever, in practice the electric power market is characterised by tough com-
petition. The unsuccessful Visaginas NPP can serve a proof of that. The 
history of this NPP project has been analysed in the works of experts 
from Saint Petersburg State University and the Immanuel Kant Baltic 
Federal University [16]. 
After the accession of the Baltics to the EU, a number of coordination 
plans were developed. In 2007, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia produced a 
draft joint strategy for ensuring energy security [17]. However, as of 2013, a 
coordinated energy policy remained at the “paper” stage. As the press ser-
vice of the Lithuanian Government reported, a meeting of the Baltic Council 
of Ministers that took place in Riga on November 8, 2013 approved Lithua-
nia’s proposal to create a joint strategic commission for the electric power 
industry in the Baltic states. “On an initiative of Lithuania, the Committee of 
senior officials of the BCM was commissioned to develop propositions re-
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garding a joint project on power generation, synchronisation with unified 
grids and power market.” The Visaginas NPP project was revisited; how-
ever, certain issues still remained unresolved [18]. There is no clarity as to 
the nature of these issues. The President of Latvia stressed in her interview 
with the Baltic News Service (BNS): "I think that continuation of the earlier 
project is probably impossible. There was a referendum, and people gave 
their opinion. Therefore, unless there are some modifications, the project is 
certainly “buried”. Perhaps we could build one reactor with the Japanese, if 
there were political will and understanding that we needed this” [19]. 
On October 22, 2013, the Lithuanian minister of energy, Jaroslav 
Neverovič, met Vice President of Hitachi Ltd, Koji Tanaka, to discuss the 
updated proposal on the Visaginas NPP project and the prospects of further 
cooperation. The minister named the synchronisation of the Baltics’ energy 
systems with the European one as one of the key areas of development. On 
the same dame, a memorandum of understanding was signed by Lietuvos 
energija and Hitachi Ltd. The memorandum suggests cooperation in the 
fields of energy supply, heat production, power storage, “smart” grids and 
other non-nuclear projects. At the same time, Director General of Lietuvos 
energija, Dalius Misiunas, stressed that, in view of the new conditions, the 
cost of power generated by VNPP could drop from 21.5 to 19.5 cents. How-
ever, it is still unclear whether this price will be lower than the market one. 
According to forecasts, in 2022—2025, cost of power may vary from 15.6 to 
almost 30 cents [20]. It remains unclear how one can forecast prices for 
power generated at a plant whose preliminary design is not developed yet. 
Obviously, the key objective is to draw additional EU funds for the purpose 
of energy infrastructure development and to ensure their diversified applica-
tion. The resources required for energy projects — estimated today at 
6,000m-6,500m euros — will not be easy to find in the Baltics, Europe and 
Japan in the current situation. If it does happen, the construction will threat-
en Russia’s economic and other interests. 
At the moment, a number of interconnections are being designed or con-
structed with the EU’s support. 
The LitPol Link, NordBal and Estlink systems, and the already function-
ing Poland — Sweden energy bridge are planned to form the new Baltic en-
ergy ring. 
In May 2008, the LitPol Link joint company was established to construct 
an energy bridge between Poland and Lithuania. It was planned to build a 
400 kV transmission line between Alytus (Lithuania) and Ełk (Poland). Its 
designed transmission capacity is 600—1,000 MW. The direction of trans-
mission will be determined by the energy needs of each country. The project 
is to be completed by 2015. The connection of Lithuanian and Polish trans-
mission lines is one of the strategic projects of the Lithuanian energy indus-
try. The system connection will cross the three Baltic states and reach west-
ern Europe, which will create conditions for the integration of electric power 
markets. 
The Lithuanian-Polish interconnection is expected to transmit up to 500 MW 
by 2015 and 1,000 MW by 2020 [21]. The project cost is estimated at 
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1,281m litai [22]. In view of inflation and unexpected expenses, one can as-
sume that the total cost of the project will amount to 2,000m litai. Lithuania 
and Poland expect that the construction of the LitPol Link interconnection 
will receive financial support of approximately 200m litai from the EU. The 
management of the Lithuanian-Polish company believes that the available 
financing tools will attract from 50 % to 75 % of the required invest-
ment [23]. However, this assumption is not based on any legally binding 
agreements. The Estlink submarine power cable — the first joint project of 
the Baltics and Finland with a budget of 110m euros — came into operation 
in December 2006. In particular, the cable was designed to provide the Nor-
dic countries with electric power generated in the Baltics. The submarine ca-
ble connects the 330 kV Harku converter station situated in the environs of 
Tallinn and the 440 kV Espoo converter station in the environs of Helsinki. 
The operation of the 250 MW cable is controlled from the specialised cen-
tres in Harku and Espoo. The second Finnish-Estonian submarine cable — 
Estlink 2 — of a designed capacity of 650 MW is being built at the moment. 
It is expected to come online at the beginning of 2014. The budget of the 
submarine cable installation project is approximately 320m euros. The EU 
will provide a 100-million-euro support [24]. 
Lithuanian and Latvian energy suppliers also signed a memorandum 
on constructing NordBalt power cable that will connect the Baltics and 
Sweden. Initially, the project estimated at 516m-738m euros was sup-
posed to be managed by Latvia. The memorandum of understanding, 
which is necessary for the commencement of works, was signed on June 9, 
2009 by the Central Project Management Agency, the Lithuanian com-
pany Lietuvos Energija, the Latvian company Latvenergo and the Swed-
ish company Svenska Kraftnat. It is planned to connect the Lithuanian 
and Swedish energy systems with a 250 km submarine power cable until 
2016. The project is estimated at 516m-738m euros and is part of the Eu-
ropean Economic Stabilisation Plan. The European Commission allocated 
175m euros for the project implementation. The 700—1000 MW Nord-
Balt interconnection between Lithuania and Sweden is scheduled to be-
come operational in 2016—2017. 
All the above-mentioned projects require substantial spending and do 
not suggest an immediate economic effect — a decrease in electricity pric-
es. The projects’ authors do not explain at what cost energy independence 
will come. Lithuania’s president Dalia Grybauskaitė stressed that  
“…as to power supply, the interconnection with Sweden, as well as Estonia 
and Finland, will have been built by 2015. Thus, we will become con-
nected to the Nordic Energy Pool in 2014—2015” [19]. 
What will the situation look like if Dalia Grybauskaitė’s plans come 
true? First, more than 2,000m euros will be spent. Secondly, as the experi-
ence of Estonia — a country that is already connected to Nord Pool — sug-
gests, electricity will not become cheaper. As of June 24, 2013, the cost of 
electricity was 55.5 euros per MWh in Finland and 103.85 in Estonia, 
whereas in Sweden it was even lower than in Finland — 42 euros per  
MWh [25]. The best possible result is the levelling of prices in Finland — 
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Sweden and Estonia — Latvia. It means that industrial and household ex-
penditures on electricity in the Baltics will increase by 1.9—2.3 times. It will 
make their national economies uncompetitive. As the president of the private 
company Itera Latvija, Juris Savickis, stressed, “the liberalisation of the Bal-
tic gas market will not result in lower electricity prices, as the general public 
thinks. On the contrary, this will lead to higher prices. It is advantageous to 
me as a businessperson. But it is a negative situation for me as a resident of 
Latvia who is interested in the development of the country” [26]. The diver-
sification required by the Third Energy Package has been partially achieved: 
Estonian electricity prices are established at Nord Pool. However, since the 
opening of the Estonian energy market (January 1, 2013), night electricity 
prices have increased by 127 % and the daytime ones by 48 %. Nevertheless, 
the Estonian Ministry of Economy assured that the tariff increase would not 
exceed 20 % [27]. Only taking into account the fact that Estonians are very 
law-abiding citizens, one can comprehend the significance of a rally against 
growing electricity prices that took place in Tallinn, at the building of the 
Ministry of Economy and Communication, on February 18, 2013. It is im-
portant to note that Estonia is not largely dependent on Russian energy and is 
almost energy sufficient. 
In Lithuania, an average electricity price can increase by 63 % by 2020 
under the current power generation policy [28]. 
Lithuania’s political plans, its extremely critical attitude to the BNPP 
and the absence of an energy contract with Poland might have entailed 
certain consequences. The 2013 guidelines for the Baltic NPP issued by 
the Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation describe two possible sce-
narios: the suspension of its construction or the introduction of some changes 
to the company’s plans [29]. At least, it means that the two 1,150 MW reac-
tors will be replaced with a 640 VVER type pressurised water reactor and 
a 40 MW reactor (KLT-40S type used on submarines). According to the 
Russian PRoAtom information agency, it means that at first the possibil-
ity of launching low-capacity reactors should be considered, whereas 
high-capacity reactors will be installed in case any opportunities for sell-
ing electric power arise [30]. The currently discussed decisions on install-
ing low-capacity units do not suggest the abandonment of the plan to 
construct a large first unit. However, they indicate that the project of a 
2,300 MW NPP — that was originally meant for energy export — will be 
changed. The plans of Rosatom to construct low-capacity units and reach 
a decision on high-capacity units in view of the overall situation are fully 
justified [31]. The reasons behind the possible changes should not be 
sought for in the ineffective position of Lithuania [30]. Rosatom reasona-
bly minimises risks associated with large-scale investment in the condi-
tions of limited sales opportunities. Russian experts have also addressed 
the issue of potential risks. Here, special attention should be paid to the 
works of Yu. M. Zverev [32; 33]. 
It is worth noting that Lithuania’s policy does not exclude a possibility 
of the disconnection of the Kaliningrad grid from that of Belarus. It can be 
performed at Bitėnai 330kV substation [34]. 
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Railway infrastructure and the Rail Baltica project 
 
The role of railway transportation in large infrastructure projects and 
economic development in general can be explained as follows: “alongside 
the immediate effects that are of significance for railway transportation per 
se, there is a wide spectrum of multifarious effects that spread throughout a 
country’s transportation system. Most external effects of the rail transport 
development are multiplicative in terms of their impact on the socioeco-
nomic development of a country” [35]. 
Taking into account the structure of the Baltic states’ economies and the 
scale of the countries’ domestic markets, one should admit that in this region 
railroads cannot be put to productive use without Russia’s participation. 
Transit is not possible without railways either. Despite the fact that the Baltic 
states have not referred to the notion of “transit bridge” for many years, in 
practice, railways remain a key industry of their economies. The Baltic 
states’ governments do pay significant attention to national railway infra-
structure. Moreover, attempts at railroad reforms have been made more than 
once. 
As the issues relating to the organisational structure are beyond the scope 
of this research, this article will focus on a major infrastructure project — 
Rail Baltica. 
First of all, it is worth noting that two different projects are being dis-
cussed almost simultaneously. While the works on the first project have al-
ready commenced, the second one is at the stage of preliminary declarations. 
The second one is a high-speed project, whereas the first one is “classical” 
— a technical connection. 
The main project initiator is Lithuania. In the late 1990s, plans for the 
development of high-speed transportation in Lithuania included the con-
struction of a high-speed line from Kaunas along the Pan-European corridor 
IX to the Belarusian border and further through Minsk to Moscow. Later, 
this line could be extended from Kaunas to Klaipeda — one of the largest 
Baltic ports. This line was meant for freight trains. Thus, it was planned to 
develop terminals of cargo companies in Klaipeda as well as multimodal 
transportation via the port [36]. This project was designed as a long-term 
project rather than a mid-term one. However, the Russian vector of transport 
integration was removed from the agenda. 
The key objective of Rail Baltica is a resumption of immediate connec-
tions between the Baltic states and the European railway network, and the 
development of regional integration. The integration of the Baltics’ railways 
into the EU transport system will increase the speed of trains and contribute 
to an increase in the passenger and cargo flows and profits. 
The project of a railway with the standard European gauge embraces the 
Baltics, eastern (Poland) and western Europe. According to the project, the 
unified European gauge railway should connect Tallinn, Riga, Kaunas, War-
saw and Berlin (later, the route is to be extended to Venice), thus improving 
transportation between central and eastern Europe. Moreover, it is planned to 
construct an undersea tunnel between Tallinn and Helsinki or (in case the 
International relations: Russia and the Baltics 
 14 
project proves economically infeasible) to launch a railway ferry between 
the cities. Therefore, in theory, Rail Baltica (or Rail Baltica II) can connect 
Scandinavia and western Europe. 
At the end of October 2006, Vilnius hosted the first presentation of the 
“final” account of feasibility studies conducted for the Rail Baltica railway 
project. In 2007, on the initiative of Lithuania’s Ministry of Transportation, 
the Lithuanian Railways company was appointed the project coordinator, 
and a special programme was devised. This programme aimed to accumulate 
budget funds and EU financial support, and to allocate them for project im-
plementation. 
In July 2007, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia prepared and coordinated 
project schedules and applied for financial help for 2007—2013. 
In June 2010, a declaration on cargo traffic along the Pan-European cor-
ridor VIII (Benilux — Germany — Poland) was signed. The Kaunas — 
Warsaw railway (part of Rail Baltica) was included in the railway corridor. 
The first project of “western” integration — the Rail Baltic line (War-
saw — Kaunas — Riga — Tallinn — Helsinki) — was considered at first as 
an inseparable part of the Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T), 
which could contribute to the development of a competitive European rail-
way network. This aspect was discussed in a declaration signed by the Pol-
ish, Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian and Finnish ministers of transport, and the 
European Commissioner for transport in Vilnius on October 19, 2009. 
During the “TEN-T DAYS 2010: Trans-European Transport Networks” 
conference, representatives of the Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian and Finnish 
ministries of transport signed a memorandum on the Rail Baltic project, thus 
expressing their political will to support its further development. The memo-
randum formulated responsibilities of the parties within the project. Despite 
the economic crisis, the parties agreed to search for new technological solu-
tions to achieve a speed of 120 km/h within the Rail Baltic project [37]. This 
is Rail Baltica I. Today, a small stretch of railway is being constructed in 
Lithuania according to the Rail Baltic I requirements, i. e. the European 
gauge and a standard train speed of 120 km/h. Taking into account the pace 
of construction and the nature of negotiations between the Baltics, the Rail 
Baltica I project can be implemented by 2025. 
The plans were undermined by the new Rail Baltic II project that sug-
gests a changed route and the use of high-speed technologies. The high-
speed railway through Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia should not be used sole-
ly for passenger traffic (as the population density in Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia is rather low, passenger traffic will not be sufficient). This line is to 
be designed as a combination, or passenger-cum-cargo, railway, which 
should ensure payback. Cargo traffic is to be integrated in the passenger train 
plan. 
The Rail Baltica II high-speed route was advertised as a project that will 
provide Estonia with a railway connection to Europe (Tallinn — Berlin). 
However, at the moment, it is an abstract expression of wishes. 
Lithuania’s Prime Minister Algirdas Butkevičius believes that the im-
plementation of the Rail Baltica II trans-European railway project will com-
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mence only after 2020. In his opinion, the required research will be com-
pleted in 2016, so the construction will be underway only in 2021—2027: 
 
We are convinced that the construction should continue after 2020… It is 
expected that, until 2016, only analysis and research will take place. It is not 
easy, there is a need for an environmental impact assessment. It should be a 
long-term project. Today [November 7, 2013], we had a more serious discus-
sion, especially with Estonia, as to applying for financial support to European 
structures. A preliminary decision was made that the project should attract 
85 % of financing from the EU funds [38]. 
 
What happened? What did that “serious discussion” with Estonia focus 
on? In reality, Lithuania is building Rail Baltica I keeping in mind the prov-
erb about birds in the hand and in the bush, whereas Tallinn is “construct-
ing” Rail Baltica II. 
Estonia’s Prime Minister of Economic Affairs and Communications Ju-
han Parts stressed that Lithuania does not adhere to the agreement with the 
neighbouring countries as to the implementation of the Rail Baltica trans-
European railway gauge project. 
 
Our Lithuanian colleagues have announced the commencement of works 
between Poland and Kaunas. However, they are not based on what we agreed 
many years ago. They say they are developing an infrastructure for a Euro-
pean railway between Kaunas and Marijampole. However, it is not the infra-
structure that will allow trains to travel at a speed of 240 km/h; the speed will 
be twice as lower [39]. 
 
According to the minister, most of the time dedicated to the project im-
plementation was spent on solving problems that were arising due to the ac-
tions of Lithuania. He stressed, “It is very important to have joint ventures 
for common infrastructure. It is a regular practice for projects of such a 
scale” [39]. In mid-September 2013, after difficult negotiations, the Baltic 
states, Poland and Finland signed a declaration on establishing a joint ven-
ture. Rail Baltic II aims to build a railroad from Helsinki through Tallinn and 
Vilnius to Warsaw, which will be extended to Berlin [39]. 
The Rail Baltica II project is dubbed as “Helsinki — Berlin”. However, 
the preliminary design “embraces a territory from Tallinn to the Lithuanian-
Polish border, whereas Poland remains a blind spot. It is still unclear wheth-
er there will be a railway in its territory and how much it might cost. There is 
no information in relation to Berlin either. Therefore, those, who speak of a 
high-speed railroad from Tallinn to Warsaw or from Tallinn to Berlin, can 
hardly say anything for sure. We just don’t know what there will be further 
than the Lithuanian-Polish border” [40]. 
Moreover, even a preliminary design has not been developed for the Tal-
linn — Helsinki stretch. Another problem is that the high-speed project con-
necting Tallinn and Berlin includes two changes in Kaunas and Warsaw. 
Finally, the general problems of the European transport policy have not 
been solved in the region. For Europe, a connection between Tallinn and Ri-
ga is not a priority. At the same time, competition for the EU funds is in-
creasing [41; 42]. 
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If the Lithuanian government accommodates Estonia’s requests, a high-
speed stretch will connect Kaunas and the Lithuanian-Polish border. As a re-
sult, three routes will run from Kaunas: 
1) the existing Russian gauge railway; 
2) a new European gauge railroad (under construction) with a speed of 
up to 120 km/h; 
3) Rail Baltica II for trains travelling at a speed of 240 km/h. 
In autumn 2013, Polish media announced the reconstruction plans for the 
stretch between Warsaw and the Lithuanian-Polish border so that it could 
accommodate trains travelling at a speed of 160 km/h. Thus, Polish experts 
indirectly confirmed that they gave little interest to the new direct route but 
preferred the old bypass one via Białystok instead. 
Since Rail Baltica II is a project of the three Baltic states, Poland has no 
official obligations in its framework. We believe that any Polish govern-
ment — especially the one formed by the Law and Justice party — will 
come up with a proposal to build a railroad on the Polish territory at the ex-
pense of the EU. Only a combination of strong external pressure and com-
pensations from the EU funds can make Warsaw participate in financing 
Rail Baltica II, i. e. the construction of the Kaunas — Berlin railroad. 
At the moment, it is not possible to discuss the cost of the project. How-
ever, mass media announced a budget of 3,600m euros. In my opinion, in 
case of the Lithuanian border — Tallinn stretch, it will be three-four times as 
great. The cost of the whole Helsinki — Berlin route may amount to  
45—50 billion euros. 
The payback periods for high-speed railways between the largest Euro-
pean capitals within the Paris — Berlin — London triangle will last for dec-
ades. International experts are right to emphasise that there is a need for an 
objective financial analysis. Our calculations suggest that the payback of the 
standard gauge will require eight return trains a day. There are other figures 
to illustrate the financial aspect of the project: the company that manages the 
Polish railway infrastructure — Polskie Linie Kolejowe S. A. — will receive 
approximately 1,300m zlotys from the EU (311.3m euros) for the moderni-
sation of a 70-kilometre stretch that constitutes part of the designed Rail Bal-
tica I railroad with the European gauge. Therefore, the modernisation — but 
not new construction — of a 70-kilometre stretch requires a 300-million-
euro subsidy, alongside Poland’s own investment. 
Let us draw some conclusions. All major infrastructure projects imple-
mented in the Baltic states have a significant political component. They are 
aimed at achieving adversely understood geoeconomic independence. Fur-
thermore, they ignore objective market laws and the logic of international 
division of labour. It is worth noting that the transport and energy integration 
of the Baltic states into the rest of the EU is part of the EU strategy for the 
Baltic region rather than an initiative of these countries. Hypothetical im-
plementation of all developed transport and energy projects will require 
25—35 billion euros. It is hardly worth noting that this sum goes far beyond 
the capacities of the national economies of the Baltic states. One of the ma-
jor EC projects aimed at the innovative development of transport, energy and 
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the Internet — Connecting Europe — received only partial support for 
2014—2020 (29 billion instead of 50 billion euros) [43]. In other words, 
theoretically, the Baltics are ready to use all funds associated with that budg-
et item “on their own,” however, they will not be given such an opportunity. 
The development of relations between the Baltic states and Russia 
should be dominated by a focus on real economic cooperation (and, even 
broader, on the opportunities offered by the Customs Union market), the cre-
ation of an atmosphere of trust in a narrowing corridor of opportunities and 
the abandonment of excessive politicisation. Today, it is not Russia that 
needs it. Today, it is necessary for our Baltic neighbours, as it is a question 
of their survival. 
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